Wa — Safe WhatsApp Automation

wa

Personal WhatsApp automation CLI + daemon, written in Go.

A hexagonal Go daemon that owns a WhatsApp Multi-Device session and a thin JSON-RPC client that talks to it — safe enough to let a language model send messages on your behalf, crash-safe enough to survive a power loss mid-migration, and paranoid enough to refuse every destructive flag you might expect.

Quickstart · Install · Manual · Architecture · Security · Contributing · Português (BR)

Capability

Pattern. Persistent WhatsApp daemon over a Unix socket — one wad process holds the Multi-Device session, ratchet store, and websocket; a thin wa JSON-RPC client invokes it.

Trade-off. ~30 MB RSS per profile and a 5–8 s cold connect, in exchange for sub-second warm-call latency on every subsequent wa send. Per-call session reattachment is avoided entirely.

Use when. A shell pipeline, cron job, or Claude Code plugin needs to dispatch WhatsApp messages with predictable latency and a non-overridable safety pipeline (default-deny allowlist + rate limiter + warmup ramp + append-only audit log) sitting below every RPC path.

brew install yolo-labz/tap/wa
wad &                                                # daemon, single instance per profile
wa pair                                              # QR-code pairing on first run
wa allow add [email protected] --actions send
wa send --to [email protected] --body "hello"

Demo

Every frame is real output from the binaries in this repo, recorded against a throwaway unpaired daemon in a private temp directory. doctor honestly warns that the device is unpaired (and may flag missing backups in the fresh sandbox). No real account data is used. The revoke command is help only, not a mutation.

The recording is generated, never hand-edited. The source of truth is the plain-text docs/assets/wa-demo.tape; regenerate the GIF, MP4, WebM, static PNG and captured text with one command:

nix develop -c ./scripts/record-demo.sh

Prefer playback controls or reduced motion? Use MP4, WebM, the static frame, or the text equivalent. Recording notes cover isolation, safety controls, byte budgets and checks. Playback is 1× and silent; no live sends are demonstrated.

How wa compares

Closest peers in the reverse-engineered-WhatsApp ecosystem:

For multi-tenant REST gateways see EvolutionAPI or WAHA — different shape of problem, listed in What this is NOT.

What this is

Two binaries, one repo:

• wad — long-running daemon that owns the WhatsApp session, the SQLite ratchet store, and the websocket to web.whatsapp.com. Runs under systemd (Linux), launchd (macOS), or a NixOS module. Single-instance per profile, never as root.
• wa — thin JSON-RPC client that speaks to wad over a unix socket. This is what shell scripts, cron jobs, and Claude Code plugins actually invoke.

It is built on go.mau.fi/whatsmeow — the library that powers mautrix-whatsapp at production scale — because it is the only reverse-engineered WhatsApp library actively maintained in 2026. It also ships a safety-first MCP server (wa mcp serve) so an AI agent drives WhatsApp through the same non-bypassable safety pipeline — draft-gated by default. See MCP server.

What this is NOT

• Not a bulk-messaging tool. The rate limiter is non-overridable and there is no --force flag anywhere.
• Not a multi-tenant SaaS. Each wa install is scoped to one person, with optional multi-profile isolation for work/personal splits.
• Not a Matrix bridge. Use mautrix-whatsapp if that's what you want.
• Not a REST gateway. Use EvolutionAPI or WAHA if that's what you want.
• Not the official WhatsApp Cloud API. This project uses the reverse-engineered Multi-Device protocol via whatsmeow.

Quickstart

# Install (Homebrew — macOS + Linuxbrew)
brew install yolo-labz/tap/wa

# Or via Nix (recommended for NixOS/nix-darwin users)
nix profile install github:yolo-labz/wa

# Or the checksum-verified installer (80 lines — inspect first if you like)
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/yolo-labz/wa/main/install.sh | bash

# Or Docker — single distroless container (~12 MB); /data holds the session
docker compose up -d   # see docker-compose.yaml; pair via `docker compose exec`

# Start the daemon (default profile)
wad &

# Pair your phone — QR code in terminal
wa pair

# Allowlist yourself (default-deny policy)
wa allow add [email protected] --actions send

# Send a message
wa send --to [email protected] --body "hello from wa"

# Install as a persistent system service
wad install-service --profile default

# Hand it to an AI agent — MCP over stdio, draft-gated sends by default:
# the agent PROPOSES messages into a human-review queue; nothing leaves
# until you run `wa draft approve`. Add to Claude Desktop/Code, Cursor:
#   {"mcpServers": {"wa": {"command": "wa", "args": ["mcp", "serve"]}}}
wa mcp serve --help

The recipient flag is spelled --to, --jid, or --group depending on the command; --chat <jid> is accepted as a universal alias on all of them (the original flags still work).

For the full tour including multi-profile setup, shell completion, migration, and the audit log, see docs/manual.md.

MCP server

wa mcp serve exposes the daemon to AI agents over the Model Context Protocol (stdio transport). Every tool call runs through the same non-bypassable safety pipeline as the CLI — default-deny allowlist, enforced short-window limits (2/second with burst 2; 30/minute with burst 30; no daily ordinary-send cap) with warmup, and an append-only audit log. Sends default to draft mode: the model proposes a message into a human-review queue and nothing leaves until you run wa draft approve. That draft-gate is the point — it is what makes handing WhatsApp to an autonomous agent safe.

Live on the official MCP Registry as io.github.yolo-labz/wa; one-click install via the signed .mcpb bundle on each release, or wire it manually into Claude Desktop/Code or Cursor:

{ "mcpServers": { "wa": { "command": "wa", "args": ["mcp", "serve"] } } }

Tools (12):

It also serves resources (read-only context surfaces) and prompts (pre-built workflows) per the MCP spec. Scope the surface with --toolsets; the send mode is draft (default), direct, or deny, and a read-only set hides every mutating tool.

See docs/mcp-registry.md for the registry publish flow and bundle internals.

Install

Homebrew (macOS + Linux)

brew install yolo-labz/tap/wa

Nix flake

# One-shot
nix run github:yolo-labz/wa -- profile list

# Install to profile
nix profile install github:yolo-labz/wa

# Dev shell (go + gopls + golangci-lint + goreleaser + sqlite + jq)
nix develop github:yolo-labz/wa

NixOS module — import the system module and enable:

{
  inputs.wa.url = "github:yolo-labz/wa";
  outputs = { self, nixpkgs, wa, ... }: {
    nixosConfigurations.myhost = nixpkgs.lib.nixosSystem {
      modules = [
        wa.nixosModules.default
        { services.wa.enable = true; services.wa.profile = "default"; }
      ];
    };
  };
}

home-manager module — import for a per-user installation:

{
  imports = [ wa.homeManagerModules.default ];
  services.wa = {
    enable = true;
    profile = "default";
    autoStart = true;
  };
}

GoReleaser tarball + supply-chain verification

VERSION=v2.0.5                                      # pin to a known tag
ARCH=linux_amd64                                    # or darwin_arm64 / linux_arm64
BASE="https://github.com/yolo-labz/wa/releases/download/$VERSION"

# 1. Download the tarball + checksums
curl -LO "$BASE/wa_${VERSION#v}_${ARCH}.tar.gz"
curl -LO "$BASE/checksums.txt"

# 2. Verify the SHA256 (defends against accidental corruption)
sha256sum -c checksums.txt --ignore-missing

# 3. Verify the SLSA-L2 attestation against THIS tarball (not just the
#    manifest) via GitHub's native attestation store. From v2.0.5 onward
#    every artifact (.tar.gz / .deb / .rpm / .apk) is registered as its
#    own attestation subject — earlier releases (≤ v2.0.4) only attested
#    `checksums.txt` and would 404 on per-artifact verify. Requires
#    `gh` CLI ≥ 2.50 (Sigstore bundle v0.3.1 support). The verify step
#    transparently checks Rekor v2 transparency-log inclusion proof on
#    the Sigstore bundle — no separate `rekor-cli` invocation needed.
gh attestation verify "wa_${VERSION#v}_${ARCH}.tar.gz" --repo yolo-labz/wa

# 4. Install
tar xzf "wa_${VERSION#v}_${ARCH}.tar.gz"
install -m 0755 wa wad ~/.local/bin/

The gh attestation verify step proves that this exact tarball was produced by the yolo-labz/wa GoReleaser job on the exact commit SHA the tag points at. Every release ships:

• wa_<version>_<os>_<arch>.tar.gz — the platform tarball
• checksums.txt — SHA256 of every artifact
• checksums.txt.sigstore.json — Cosign-signed Sigstore bundle for checksums.txt (legacy/optional verify path; not needed when using gh attestation verify against the artifact above)
• sbom.cdx.json — CycloneDX 1.6 SBOM (full repo, syft)
• sbom.spdx.json — SPDX 2.3 SBOM (full repo, syft)
• sbom.gomod.{wa,wad}.cdx.json — Go-native CycloneDX SBOMs (cyclonedx-gomod, per binary, with stdlib + license info)
• openvex.json — OpenVEX 0.2 statement file. VEX-aware scanners (Trivy, Grype) consume this to filter "is this CVE actually exploitable in wa?" — most transitive CVEs are not_affected because the depguard-enforced port boundary keeps them off the runtime path. Statements grow as findings emerge; current baseline is empty pending per-CVE triage.
• CHANGELOG.md — git-cliff generated changelog

darwin users — unsigned release: releases cut without an Apple Developer account ship the darwin-arm64 binary unsigned and un-notarized. Gatekeeper will quarantine it on first launch. Strip the quarantine flag before running:

xattr -cr ~/.local/bin/wa ~/.local/bin/wad

Or install via the Homebrew tap (brew install yolo-labz/tap/wa) — brew rebuilds from source locally and bypasses the quarantine entirely. Signed + notarized darwin binaries return on the next GA tag cut after APPLE_DEVELOPER_ID_APPLICATION_{CERT,KEY} secrets are populated.

go install

The module path includes the /v2 suffix per Go's semantic import versioning rule for v2+ releases.

# Pin to a tag (recommended — reproducible builds need a known revision):
go install github.com/yolo-labz/wa/v2/cmd/[email protected]
go install github.com/yolo-labz/wa/v2/cmd/[email protected]

# Or follow main:
go install github.com/yolo-labz/wa/v2/cmd/wa@latest
go install github.com/yolo-labz/wa/v2/cmd/wad@latest

go install on a tag does NOT inherit the GoReleaser build flags (-trimpath, -buildvcs=true, ldflag-stamped version). The resulting binary will run, but wa --version reports (devel). Use the GoReleaser tarball or the Homebrew tap if version-stamped, reproducible binaries matter to you.

Multi-profile

Run two WhatsApp accounts side-by-side — personal and work, or one per client — with full process isolation. Each profile has its own session.db, allowlist.toml, audit.log, rate limiter, unix socket, and warmup timestamp.

wa profile create work
wad --profile work &
wa --profile work pair
wa --profile work status

wa profile list
# PROFILE   ACTIVE  STATUS      JID                          LAST_SEEN
# default   *       connected   [email protected] 2026-04-11T17:00:00Z
# work              connected   [email protected] 2026-04-11T17:00:00Z

Profile selection precedence (highest wins):

1. --profile <name> flag
2. WA_PROFILE env var (empty = unset)
3. $XDG_CONFIG_HOME/wa/active-profile pointer
4. Singleton (if exactly one profile exists)
5. Literal default

See docs/manual.md §4.

Safety

wa is safe enough to let a language model invoke it on your behalf. The safety pipeline is non-overridable and lives inside the daemon, below every RPC path:

• Allowlist, default-deny. Per-action (read / send / group.add / group.create). Hot-reloaded on SIGHUP. Mutated via wa allow add/remove.
• Rate limiter. Ordinary sends are capped at 2/sec (burst 2) and 30/min (burst 30), with no daily ordinary-send cap. No --force flag. Ever.
• Warmup ramp. Fresh sessions run at 25 % caps while age is <7 days, 50 % from age 7 through <14 days, and 100 % from age 14 days onward. Timestamp sourced from the session store so daemon restarts don't reset the clock.
• Audit log. Append-only JSON Lines at $XDG_STATE_HOME/wa/<profile>/audit.log. Every send + every allowlist decision + every migration is recorded. Never auto-rotated — back it up yourself.
• Inbound prompt-injection firewall. Inbound message bodies are wrapped in <channel source="wa" ...>…</channel> tags before reaching Claude Code so the model can structurally distinguish "the user typed this in the terminal" from "an unknown contact sent this".
• Crash-safe migration. 007→008 migration uses a write-ahead marker + single os.Rename pivot + fsync barriers. Proven by a subprocess SIGKILL injection test that kills the process between every step and asserts zero data loss on recovery.
• Socket hardening. Unix socket + sibling lockfile opened with O_NOFOLLOW (CVE-2025-68146), parent directory verified mode 0700 + euid-owned, SO_PEERCRED check on every accept, umask-narrowed bind.

Full threat model: SECURITY.md.

Architecture

                  ┌──────────────────────────┐
                  │         cmd/wa           │  thin JSON-RPC client
                  │  (cobra, no business     │  (stateless, re-invokable,
                  │   logic, no state)       │   what scripts actually call)
                  └─────────────┬────────────┘
                                │  JSON-RPC 2.0 over
                                │  $XDG_RUNTIME_DIR/wa/<profile>.sock
                                ▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                         cmd/wad                              │  composition root
│                                                              │  (one process per profile)
│   ┌─────────────────────────┐    ┌────────────────────────┐  │
│   │ internal/app/dispatcher │◄──►│ Safety pipeline:       │  │
│   │  (use cases, port-only) │    │  allowlist + rate lim  │  │
│   │                         │    │  + warmup + audit      │  │
│   └───────────┬─────────────┘    └────────────────────────┘  │
│               │                                              │
│               ▼  9 port interfaces                           │
│   ┌───────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐  │
│   │             internal/adapters/secondary              │  │
│   │  whatsmeow | sqlitestore | sqlitehistory | memory    │  │
│   │  slogaudit | …                                       │  │
│   └───────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘  │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
                                │
                                │  Signal Protocol ratchets +
                                │  WhatsApp Multi-Device websocket
                                ▼
                        web.whatsapp.com

• Hexagonal core (internal/domain/, internal/app/) depends only on the 9 port interfaces in internal/app/ports.go. Not one import of go.mau.fi/whatsmeow outside the adapters, enforced by a golangci-lint depguard rule that is CI-blocking.
• Port-boundary fakes: every secondary adapter ships an in-memory twin for tests. The contract test suite (internal/app/porttest/) runs against any adapter. No test reaches the real websocket.
• One daemon per profile. Feature 008 bounds the blast radius: a crash in one profile's daemon never touches another. Trade-off: ~30 MB RSS per profile.
• No CGO. Ever. modernc.org/sqlite is the only SQLite path. Enforced in the Nix flake (env.CGO_ENABLED = "0"), in GoReleaser, and in the go.mod toolchain flags.

For the full design and reliability principles, see docs/manual.md.

Command reference (at a glance)

Client (wa):

Daemon (wad):

Full flag reference: docs/manual.md §6.

Inspecting the daemon (when the CLI "lies")

The daemon owns the SQLite truth; the CLI is a thin client over it. When a command's output looks wrong — a chat you expect is missing, a message count seems stale — work down this ladder. The first rung resolves almost every case without touching the database.

1. First-class discovery commands (the supported path)

These read straight from the daemon and need no SQL. They replace the old docker cp messages.db + hand-rolled SELECT workaround:

Add --json to any of them for NDJSON you can pipe to jq. Against a Dokku deploy, run the same commands inside the container — dokku enter <app> -- /usr/local/bin/wa chat list — or over an SSH-forwarded socket with scripts/wa-remote chat list.

2. wa doctor

If the discovery commands themselves look impossible (e.g. zero chats on a paired account), run wa doctor. It runs 11 checks — socket perms, pairing state, on-disk layout version, audit-log size — and prints a hint: line for every WARN/FAIL. A schema_version WARN means the on-disk layout drifted from domain.LayoutSchemaVersion; run wa migrate to forward-migrate.

3. Raw SQLite (last resort)

The production image is gcr.io/distroless/static-debian12:nonroot — no shell, no sqlite3, no ls/find. You therefore cannot dokku enter <app> -- sqlite3 …, and there is intentionally no wa-debug sidecar image (it would widen the attack surface the distroless base exists to shrink). Instead, query a WAL-safe snapshot from the Dokku host, which has its own sqlite3:

# messages.db lives under XDG_DATA_HOME → on the host storage mount:
DB=/var/lib/dokku/data/storage/<app>/data/wa/<profile>/messages.db   # <profile> defaults to "default"

# Snapshot via the online-backup API (WAL-safe; never `cp` a live WAL DB):
ssh dokku.example.com sudo -u dokku-65532 \
    sqlite3 "$DB" ".backup '/tmp/messages-snapshot.db'"

# Inspect the snapshot, not the live file:
ssh dokku.example.com sqlite3 /tmp/messages-snapshot.db \
    "SELECT chat_jid, push_name, COUNT(*) AS msgs, MAX(ts) AS last
       FROM messages
      WHERE chat_jid LIKE '%@s.whatsapp.net'
      GROUP BY chat_jid ORDER BY last DESC LIMIT 20;"

On-disk layout (container path → Dokku host path under /var/lib/dokku/data/storage/<app>):

Copying a live WAL-mode DB with cp can produce a corrupt file — always go through .backup. See the Backups section of docs/deploy/dokku.md.

Development

# Clone
git clone [email protected]:yolo-labz/wa.git
cd wa

# Devshell (Nix users)
nix develop

# Or use your own Go toolchain (1.26+, matching go.mod)
go version

# Build
go build ./cmd/wa ./cmd/wad

# Test (race detector on by default; ~20s wall clock)
go test -race ./...

# Lint
golangci-lint run

# Format
gofumpt -w .

# Nix build + smoke test
nix build .#default && ./result/bin/wa version

# Snapshot release (local only, no publish)
goreleaser release --snapshot --clean --skip=publish

Workflow: every change lands via PR against main, commit subjects follow Conventional Commits. See CONTRIBUTING.md.

CI/CD runs on a self-hosted GitHub Actions runner pool (label set [self-hosted, dokku], with one runner — wa-sonar-runner — additionally labelled sonar). Required-check jobs: detect, lint (golangci-lint), test (race + shuffle + coverage), sonar (SonarQube scan, consumes the cover.out artifact), nix (nix flake check + nix build .#default + smoke), commitlint (PR title), Reproducibility (two-build byte-identity), OSV-Scanner (vuln DB + Go call-graph reachability via internal govulncheck), gitleaks (secret scan), CodeQL (Go + actions). Hosted runners are reserved for OpenSSF Scorecard (needs fresh image guarantees). Release workflow triggers on v* tags and publishes GoReleaser tarballs + dual SBOMs (CycloneDX 1.6 + SPDX 2.3 + Go-native per-binary) + Cosign Sigstore bundles + GitHub-native attestations to GitHub Releases. Apple notarization and Homebrew tap publication graceful-degrade when their secrets are absent.

Project status

Live backlog (deferred until a profile pin or external action exists): homebrew_casks: migration (replaces brews:, but Linuxbrew loses formula path on darwin-only casks — needs apt/rpm via nFPM as a Linux substitute first), LID/BSUID dual-keying in domain.JID (Meta June 2026 username rollout), default.pgo PGO profile (capture pipeline + commit), actions/attest migration off the attest-build-provenance@v4 wrapper.

Who this is for

One person — the maintainer. Multi-tenancy, hosted SaaS, and group-bulk-messaging use cases are explicitly out of scope. The entire safety story assumes a single-user threat model where FileVault / LUKS is the encryption boundary and wa panic is the recovery button. If that's not what you want, use one of the alternatives listed in What this is NOT.

License

Apache-2.0. The go.mau.fi/whatsmeow upstream is MPL-2.0, which is file-level copyleft and does not propagate to consumers (Mozilla MPL FAQ Q9–Q11). The Apache choice matches the precedent set by Anthropic's official Telegram channel plugin and gives an explicit patent grant.

Acknowledgements

• tulir/whatsmeow — Tulir Asokan and the mautrix project, for the only WhatsApp library worth using in 2026.
• AsamK/signal-cli — for proving that a daemon-plus-thin-CLI architecture for an end-to-end-encrypted messenger is achievable in a single binary.
• aldinokemal/go-whatsapp-web-multidevice — closest prior art, solving a different shape of the problem (REST gateway vs CLI daemon).
• spf13/cobra + creachadair/jrpc2 + modernc.org/sqlite — the three load-bearing Go libraries that make this project CGO-free, testable, and pleasant to maintain.
• rogpeppe/go-internal — for lockedfile and testscript, both of which the project leans on heavily.

See also (yolo-labz ecosystem)

• yolo-labz/claude-mac-chrome — Chrome automation for cross-app pipelines (e.g., LinkedIn DM → triage → WhatsApp follow-up via this daemon).
• yolo-labz/linkedin-chrome-copilot — LinkedIn workflow plugin that composes with wa for cross-channel automation.
• yolo-labz/kokoro-speakd — TTS daemon for spoken status feedback during long-running send batches.
• Architecture deep-dives + WhatsApp-daemon design rationale: blog.home301server.com.br.
• Author portfolio: portfolio.home301server.com.br.

Services

Compliance-grade AI architecture for regulated workloads — async-first, USD-denominated, LATAM-based / EN-fluent. See blog.home301server.com.br/services.