Cork MCP Server
MCP server for Cork's cyber-insurance API for MSPs - clients and their warranty/coverage status, Cork Cyber Score history, risk & compliance events, software vulnerabilities (CVE/CVSS/EPSS/KEV), connected integrations, invoices, distributor partners, and software-installer metadata - for AI assistants and the WYRE Conduit gateway.
Authentication
Cork authenticates with a static Bearer API key, generated in Cork's Admin UI (Settings -> API). Cork's OpenAPI spec also documents an OAuth2 flow for their own remote MCP server, but the underlying credential is the same API key - this connector never performs an OAuth dance, it only ever holds a live bearer key, sent as Authorization: Bearer <key> to Cork's API. In gateway mode the key arrives per-request via the X-Cork-Api-Key header; in local/stdio mode it's read once from CORK_API_KEY.
Configuration
Tools
Clients
cork_get_clients- list clients with warranty status, integration tenants, and recent Cork Cyber Scores.cork_get_client_devices- list devices observed for a client across all connected integrations.cork_get_client_domains- list email domains observed for a client.cork_get_client_inboxes- list email inboxes observed for a client.cork_get_client_score_history- list a client's full Cork Cyber Score history, newest first.
Risk & Compliance
cork_get_compliance_events- list policy violations and risk events detected for a client's assets.cork_get_compliance_notification_settings- list notification/alerting rules for compliance events.cork_get_compliance_event_types- list all compliance event types with descriptions and cure periods.cork_get_software_vulnerabilities- list individual CVEs with CVSS/EPSS/KEV details.cork_get_software_vulnerability_summary- get a rollup of CVEs grouped by software product.
Integrations - read-only subset
cork_get_available_integrations- list integration types that can be connected to Cork.cork_get_connected_integrations- list integrations connected to Cork.cork_get_integration_devices- list devices observed from an integration.cork_get_integration_tenants- list customer tenants observed from an integration.cork_get_integration_users- list users observed from an integration.
Warranty
cork_get_warranties- list active cyber warranty packages.
Invoice
cork_get_invoices- list billing invoices.cork_get_invoice_line_items- list billed line items for an invoice.
Distributor - read-only subset
cork_get_partners- list partner sub-accounts managed by this distributor.
Software Installer - read-only subset
cork_get_installer_history- list past software install attempts.cork_get_software_packages- list software packages available to install.cork_get_installer_setup- get one-time RMM setup instructions for software installs.
Who
cork_who_am_i- get information on the authenticated user.
Scope
This is a deliberately narrow, read-only, non-credential-exposing v1 surface, hard-scoped to exactly 23 of Cork's 31 operations (29 documented paths). Every tool is classified isAdmin: true in the Conduit gateway given the sensitivity of insurance/risk/compliance data. Roughly a third of Cork's full API is write- or secret-exposing; none of it is implemented here, by design, not by oversight:
Hard-excluded (credential-exposing) - never implemented:
GET /integrations/{uuid}/credentials(get-integration-credentials) - returns the integration's raw stored third-party secrets (credentials: {...}).
Hard-excluded (bulk raw-data exfiltration, excluded out of caution alongside credentials):
GET /integrations/{uuid}/raw-data(get-integration-raw-data) - returns a presigned download URL (10-minute expiry) to a client's full raw synced integration data. Not a credential return, but a bulk-data-exfiltration vector gated by "requires distributor privileges" in Cork's own spec. Flagged explicitly for review in the wiring PR rather than silently included.
Hard-excluded (provisioning/mutation) - never implemented:
POST /distributor/partners(provision-partner) - provisions a new Partner account.POST /integrations(connect-integration) - connects a new integration and immediately begins syncing data.PATCH /integrations/{uuid}(update-integration) - updates an integration's name and/or credentials.DELETE /integrations/{uuid}(delete-integration) - deletes an integration.POST /integrations/{uuid}/resync(resync-integration) - manually triggers a data refresh.POST /software/installer/install(install-software) - dispatches a real software install to a real managed endpoint through the client's RMM. A genuine remote-software-provisioning action.
They can be added as a follow-up if there's demand, after a deliberate scope decision - not by default.
Credential scope
This connector's own code is read-only by construction — the underlying API key is not. Cork's own documentation states API key permissions are linked to the user who creates them; no read-only or restricted-scope key type is documented. Two separate claims, kept at different confidence levels:
- Structurally verified (checked directly, stated with full confidence): this connector's own code makes zero write/delete/resync/provisioning calls, and never calls the credentials or raw-data endpoints. Every function in
client.tscalls one of the 23 documented read operations above — no wildcard/passthrough call anywhere insrc/. - Vendor-documented, not independently verified (hedged deliberately): Cork's own docs do not describe any narrower or read-only API key type. A key generated by a full-access Cork user can very likely reach the write/delete/credentials/raw-data operations this connector excludes — this has not been tested against a live key, and WYRE found no vendor-offered way to restrict it further at the credential level.
Do not read this connector, or this README, as having established the underlying API key is itself restricted — only that this connector's own code never attempts anything beyond its 23 read operations.
Development
npm install
npm run build
npm test
npm run lint # tsc --noEmit
Docker
docker build -t cork-mcp .
docker run -p 8080:8080 -e CORK_API_KEY=... cork-mcp