storage/network/firewall/access writes that can alter cluster state
advanced remote execution such as pve_exec_in_container
The server returns a structured CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED error when confirmation is missing. This behavior is unchanged and reinforced.
Human approval
confirm=true is supplied by the agent, not by you. A model that reads the rejection can simply
retry with the flag set, so on its own that check guards against an accident rather than against a
confident agent — and it never asks you anything.
So the 47 tools that require confirmation are also announced to the client as needing a person:
In Claude Code 2.1.199 and later, a tool marked this way prompts on every call — including in
auto and bypassPermissions modes — and cannot be pre-approved by an allow rule or by a
PreToolUse hook returning allow. Under --permission-prompt-tool an automated approval is
converted to a denial, and Remote Control withholds one-tap approval and sends you to the full
prompt. The operator who answered is the one who authorised the operation.
One caveat, measured on 2.1.229 rather than taken from the documentation: the prompt still offers
"Yes, and don't ask again", even though the documentation says a flagged tool has no such option.
Choosing it writes an allow rule that does not retire the gate — the next call prompts again.
So the behaviour is right and only the button is misleading. Do not read its absence as the signal
that the guard is on; verify by calling a gated tool twice.
Starting and resuming a guest are deliberately left out: they change state without destroying
anything, and a guard people resent is a guard people route around.
setup additionally writes matching permissions.ask rules into .claude/settings.json, which
cover Claude Code versions that predate the annotation. Rules are evaluated deny, then ask, then
allow — first match wins — so an ask rule survives both bypassPermissions and a later
"yes, don't ask again". For an install that was configured by hand rather than through setup:
nandi-proxmox-mcp harden # every configured instance
nandi-proxmox-mcp harden --name lab # just one
Both mechanisms are Claude Code specific. In any other client the guards are confirm=true and the
access tier, so choose the tier deliberately there.
Access tiers
read-only
Inventory, status, logs, metrics, and non-mutating diagnostics.
read-execute
Read-only plus selected execution/lifecycle actions.
full
Create, update, delete, migrate, restore, and admin-level operations.
PVE_MODULE_MODE=core hides advanced tools without renaming or removing canonical tool IDs from the codebase.
Runtime configuration
Environment variables
Required:
PROXMOX_HOST
PROXMOX_USER
PROXMOX_REALM
PROXMOX_TOKEN_NAME
PROXMOX_TOKEN_SECRET
PROXMOX_SSH_HOST
PROXMOX_SSH_USER
PROXMOX_SSH_KEY_PATH
Optional:
PROXMOX_PORT default 8006
PROXMOX_SSH_PORT default 22
PROXMOX_ALLOW_INSECURE_TLS default false
PVE_ACCESS_TIER=read-only|read-execute|full
PVE_MODULE_MODE=core|advanced
PVE_CATEGORIES
PVE_TOOL_BLACKLIST
PVE_TOOL_WHITELIST
HTTP transport:
MCP_TRANSPORT=stdio|http
MCP_HOST default 0.0.0.0
MCP_PORT default 3000
MCP_ALLOWED_HOSTS
MCP_ALLOWED_ORIGINS
MCP_RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_MS
MCP_RATE_LIMIT_MAX
MCP_MAX_BODY_SIZE_BYTES
MCP_HEADERS_TIMEOUT_MS
MCP_REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS
MCP_KEEPALIVE_TIMEOUT_MS
MCP_MAX_HEADERS_COUNT
Local config file
Setup writes one credentials file per configured Proxmox,
.nandi-proxmox-mcp/<instance>.json, plus a registration entry in each client
config it was asked for — .mcp.json for Claude Code and .vscode/mcp.json for
VS Code, by default both.
The credentials file is the only one holding the token, and it is gitignored.
When NANDI_PROXMOX_CONFIG is not set, the server discovers it: a single
configured instance is used automatically, and more than one is an error naming
them rather than a guess.
The config loader now rejects:
empty or malformed config paths
oversized config files
control characters in config paths
Quick start
Never used an MCP before? Start with
docs/EMPEZAR.md — a step-by-step guide (in Spanish) that
assumes no prior MCP knowledge and covers creating the Proxmox token, which
is the part that trips most people up.
You need an API token from your own Proxmox first. This prints the commands
that create one, ready to paste into the Proxmox shell — it connects to
nothing:
npx nandi-proxmox-mcp bootstrap --tier read-only
Then guided setup. By default this writes config for Claude Code
(.mcp.json) and VS Code (.vscode/mcp.json), merging into either file if
it already exists:
npx nandi-proxmox-mcp setup --access-tier read-only
npx nandi-proxmox-mcp doctor --check mcp-config,nodes,vms,cts,node-status,remote-op
Start with --access-tier read-only. The server's built-in default is full,
which exposes every destructive tool including arbitrary command execution;
passing the flag writes the tier explicitly into the client config so the
choice is visible rather than implicit. Raise it once you trust the setup.
Pick specific clients, or print a block for any other MCP client:
.mcp.json holds only a config path and policy settings, so it is safe to
commit and share. Your API token stays in .nandi-proxmox-mcp/config.json,
which is gitignored.
This MCP server operates real Proxmox infrastructure and is not a sandboxed environment.
Trust Assumptions
The server is deployed in a trusted environment
Only authorized operators can access it
Network exposure is controlled (not publicly exposed)
Credentials are securely managed
Residual Risks
The following risks are inherent to the system design:
Privileged Operations
Full access tier and container execution capabilities can perform destructive or system-level actions.
SSH Execution Boundary
Remote command execution relies on SSH and inherits the security posture of the target system.
Optional Insecure TLS Mode
When enabled (PROXMOX_ALLOW_INSECURE_TLS=true), TLS certificate validation is bypassed and may expose connections to MITM attacks. Intended for lab use only.
External Dependency Synchronization
Package distribution and listing visibility depend on npm, MCP Registry, and marketplace propagation timing.
Security Responsibilities
Users are responsible for:
Restricting access to trusted operators only
Using least-privilege API tokens and SSH keys
Avoiding insecure TLS in production environments
Properly securing the underlying infrastructure
Safety Controls Implemented
Access tiers (read-only, read-execute, full)
Confirmation required for destructive operations
Human approval required for those same operations, see Human approval
Input validation and command hardening
Rate limiting and request validation
HTTP hardening
The HTTP transport performs no authentication. There is no bearer token,
API key, or client-certificate check on POST /mcp; the controls below are
network-level only. MCP_HOST also defaults to 0.0.0.0, and the host
allowlist includes your configured Proxmox and SSH hosts. Anyone who can
reach the port and send a matching Host header gets the full registered
tool surface — which, with the default PVE_ACCESS_TIER=full, includes
destructive tools and arbitrary command execution.
Only enable MCP_TRANSPORT=http on a trusted network, behind an
authenticating reverse proxy, or bound to 127.0.0.1 via MCP_HOST. The
default stdio transport is not affected: it has no network surface.
When MCP_TRANSPORT=http is enabled, the server applies:
host allowlist enforcement, including wildcard-bind protection
origin validation for requests that send an Origin header
explicit body-size limits and sanitized 413 responses
rate limiting on /mcp
request/header/keep-alive timeouts
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
Cache-Control: no-store
sanitized error payloads without stack traces
Health/readiness endpoints:
GET /health
GET /ready
POST /mcp
SSH and command-execution hardening
Functionality is unchanged, but the execution path is stricter:
local command execution still uses spawn(..., { shell: false })
Releases are automatic. A push to main runs auto-release.yml, which reads the bump level
from the conventional-commit subjects since the last v* tag, writes the new version into every
file that carries one, commits chore(release): vX.Y.Z, and pushes the tag. The tag is what
starts release.yml and the publish below.
A push with nothing releasable finishes green and lists the commits it skipped. Run the workflow
by hand with dry_run: true to see the version and the diff without publishing.
The version lives in eight places — manifests, both registry descriptors, the marketplace plugin,
two docs examples and two TypeScript literals. scripts/set-version.mjs writes all of them and
scripts/validate-package-metadata.mjs gates all of them. Adding a ninth means editing both:
a writer that touches a file the validator ignores is how 0.3.1 shipped announcing itself as
0.2.4.
Release order, once the tag exists, is strict:
npm run lint
npm run typecheck
npm run build
npm test
npm audit --include=dev --audit-level=moderate
npm ls express
npm ls path-to-regexp
npm pack --dry-run
npm pack
npm whoami
npm publish --access public
npm view nandi-proxmox-mcp version
mcp-publisher validate .mcp/server.json
mcp-publisher publish .mcp/server.json
The tag-based release.yml now publishes npm first and only then publishes the MCP Registry descriptor, preventing npm/registry drift on the same version.
If a release dies halfway, re-run it — gh workflow run release.yml --ref vX.Y.Z — rather than
finishing it by hand. Every publishing step asks its destination first and skips what is already
there, so the re-run completes only the parts that did not happen. The job refuses any ref that is
not a tag, and any tag that disagrees with the version in package.json.
npm ci
npm run lint
npm run typecheck
npm run build
npm test
npm run validate:release
npm pack --dry-run
Documentation Maintenance Policy
This repository follows a documentation sync policy, enforced in review rather than by a git hook.
There is no pre-commit hook. The one gate that is automated is in CI
(.github/workflows/ci.yml): it regenerates docs/TOOLS.md and fails the
build on any drift. Note also that a repo-local .git/hooks/pre-commit would
not run on a machine where core.hooksPath is redirected, which is common.
Before closing a change, fix, or refactor, evaluate whether README.md, AGENTS.md, and CONTRIBUTING.md must be updated.
If a document is relevant to the behavioral or process impact, it must be updated in the same change set.
If no update is needed, an explicit no-doc-change justification is required.
A task is not considered ready-to-commit until this gate is satisfied.